
TOWARDS A NEW RELATIONSHIP:

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

Copyright 1990 by:

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
1717 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 605, Washington, DC 20036
(202) 328-3136 FAX: (202) 328-3144 TELEX: 5106015068 NDIIA

Copies available for \$6.00.



NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Suite 605, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 328-3136 • FAX (202) 328-3144 • Telex 5106015068 NDI LA

Chairman

Walter F. Mondale

Vice Chair

Madeleine K. Albright

Secretary

Rachelle Horowitz

Treasurer

Peter G. Kelly

President

J. Brian Atwood

Board of Directors

David L. Aaron

Harriet C. Babbitt

Elizabeth F. Bagley

James B. Booe

John C. Culver

John P. Duntsev

Thomas F. Eagleton

Geraldine A. Ferraro

Maurice Ferré

Marité Hernández

Gerri M. Joseph

John T. Joyce

Jan Kalicki

Penn Kemble

Paul G. Kirk, Jr.

Elliott F. Kulick

John Lewis

Leon Lynch

Lewis Mamilow

Kenneth F. Mellev

Julius Michaelson

Stuart G. Moldaw

Mark A. Siegel

Michael Steed

Maurice Tempelsman

William G. Thomas

Esteban E. Torres

Mark S. Weiner

Marvin F. Weissberg

Senior Advisory Committee

Michael D. Barnes

John Brademas

Bill Bradley

Richard F. Celeste

Mario M. Cuomo

Patricia M. Derian

Michael S. Dukakis

March Fong Eu

Richard N. Gardner

Madeleine M. Kunin

Mike J. Mansfield

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

Edmund S. Muskie

Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.

Charles S. Robb

Stephen J. Solarz

Cyrus Vance

Anne Wexler

Andrew J. Young

Chairman Emeritus

Charles T. Mannatt

Executive Vice President

Kenneth D. Wollack

Senior Consultant

Patricia J. Keeter

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) conducts nonpartisan political development programs overseas. By working with political parties and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions and pluralistic values in new and emerging democracies. NDI has conducted a series of democratic development programs in nearly 30 countries, including Argentina, Chile, Haiti, Hungary, Liberia, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Poland, Taiwan and Uruguay.

conducting nonpartisan international programs to help maintain and strengthen democratic institutions

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword by NDI Chairman Walter F. Mondale	i
Introduction	iii
Conference Report	1
A. Summary	1
B. Overview	2
C. The Issues Confronting Argentine Policymakers	4
1. The Role of the Parliament	4
2. Command and Control of the Armed Forces in a Democracy	8
3. The Integration of Civilian and Military Institutions in a Democratic Society	8
4. Democracy, Intelligence and Internal Security	11
D. The Case of Uruguay	14
E. Conclusion	15
Appendices:	
I. Declaration of Montevideo	17
II. Conference-Related Legislation in Argentina	20
III. Conference Agenda	31
IV. Conference Participants	35

FOREWORD

In a democratic society, legitimate power must derive from the consent of the governed. Therefore, the elected, civilian government is regarded as the ultimate authority over military affairs; subordination of the military is essential for the exercise of democratic government.

Agreement on issues concerning the national defense, and the mission and structure of the armed forces, must be the result of a broad social and political consensus. If they are not, armed institutions face the prospect of hard questioning -- from without and from within -- about their own relevance. A military without broad civilian support risks being seen as an occupying force in its own nation.

Although it is true that military issues are too important to leave exclusively to the military, it is equally true that civil society must understand and appreciate the legitimate role of professional, non-partisan armed forces. Civilians who have a role in the debate over defense and military issues must develop the experience and expertise necessary to carry out informed, well-planned defense policies.

In countries that have recently returned to democratic rule, it is often difficult to find civilians who have developed their own expertise in military issues. In fact, the very nature of authoritarian regimes conspires against the sustained formation of such civilian experts. The lack of continuity in democratic political institutions can mean a loss of historical memory, gaps in technical training, and an absence of personal ties between civilians and the military that sustains good will in times of crisis.

In this context, this report -- Towards a New Relationship: The Role of the Military in a Democratic Government -- has a special value. Based on a conference on civil-military relations sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the work focuses on the experience of Argentina during its recent six-year democratic experiment -- a sometimes turbulent period marked by three military uprisings and a terrorist attack against an army base.

The conference brought together some of Argentina's best civilian and military minds. Their insights were shared and evaluated by experts from Israel, Spain and the United States -- countries where civil-military relations have been successfully managed in a stable, democratic environment -- and from Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil -- nations still struggling with the legacy of their own authoritarian past.

This report seeks to provide the reader with a critical outline for improving civil-military relations in emerging democracies. It offers insights into efforts already underway in Argentina to develop healthy civil-military relations, as well as to recommend what still needs to be done -- in parliament, in the defense ministry, and at military headquarters.

Argentines from all walks of life can be justly proud of the democracy they have created. They can justifiably demand continued international support for their efforts to consolidate the country's democratic institutions.

For centuries, political thinkers have pondered the question: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? -- Who will guard the guardians? The response found in the following pages underscores Argentina's determination to press ahead with the integration of the military into democratic society. In the final analysis, a proper civil-military relationship must be built upon laws and institutions, and upon the elected officials who administer them. But the true determinant are those values that are necessary to promote and sustain democratic government.

WALTER F. MONDALE

INTRODUCTION

In July 1989, less than two weeks after the inauguration of President Carlos Menem, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) convened more than 90 military and civilian experts on defense issues for a conference in Montevideo, Uruguay (See Appendix IV for participants). By focusing on the recent experience of Argentina, the group agreed on a series of practical suggestions for improving civil-military relations in emerging democracies.

The conference recommendations, incorporated into "The Declaration of Montevideo" (See Appendix I), included the suggestion that existing laws, including constitutions, be amended to stipulate the armed force's subordination to civilian rule. "The formulation of military strategy should reflect the priorities of a country's civilian leadership," the communique said.

The conference participants also called for open channels of communication between the legislature and the military, as well as a greater role for parliamentary defense committees in the development and oversight of military budgets. The declaration recommended that the armed forces refrain from domestic intelligence activities and, in the case of Argentina, that the police -- not the armed forces -- lead the war against drug trafficking.

The Montevideo conference, entitled "Towards a New Relationship: The Role of the Military in a Democratic Government," brought together legislators, political leaders, military officers, and civil-military experts from Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Israel, Spain, Paraguay and the U.S. In a series of workshops, the conferees focused on the experience of Argentina, which has recently undergone transitions from military to civilian rule. Six of the Argentine parliamentarians who participated in the conference returned to Buenos Aires and introduced legislation designed to implement the recommendations of the Montevideo declaration (See Appendix II).

The Montevideo event was the third in a series of NDI programs to help promote healthier civil-military relations in Argentina and other nascent democracies in Latin America. The conference was cosponsored by the Arturo Illia Foundation (FAI) and the Center for the Study of the National Project (CEPNA) of Argentina, and the Center for the Study of Uruguayan Democracy (CELADU) and the Political, Economic and Social Study Society (SEPES) of Uruguay.

In December 1988, just days after Argentina was shaken by a third military uprising in less than two years, NDI sponsored its first civil-military seminar in the Dominican Republic.

Participants in that seminar had recommended exchange programs between new and traditional democracies as a means to enhance the knowledge of civilians in defense issues.

In April 1989, NDI invited six Argentine political and military leaders to Washington, D.C., to exchange ideas and experiences with leading U.S. experts on defense policy. The Argentine visitors examined the design of defense budgets, intelligence oversight, and the training of civilians and military personnel in defense and security issues.

The conference in Montevideo built upon these two previous experiences. First, it sought to broaden an understanding between military and political professionals in Argentina. Second, it introduced new ideas to civilians interested in defense issues. And third, it highlighted specific steps that could be taken in four crucial areas to promote better civil-military relations.

The following is a report of the conference deliberations. It was written by Martin Edwin Andersen, NDI director for Latin American and Caribbean programs, and is based in part on the notes of conference rapporteur, Dr. Gary Wynia. Ken Wollack, NDI executive vice president, and Sue Grabowski, NDI public information director, edited the report. NDI Program Assistant Peter A. Silverman was responsible for overseeing its production.

TOWARDS A NEW RELATIONSHIP:
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

SUMMARY

In July 1989, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) sponsored the third in a series of international conferences and workshops on civil-military relations in emerging democracies. The seminar-workshop, held in Montevideo, Uruguay, focused on Argentina, whose nascent democracy had just marked another milestone with the inauguration of its second consecutive elected civilian president, Carlos S. Menem. The purpose of the Montevideo meeting was to facilitate the integration of civilian and military societies, and to address defense issues within a constitutional framework.

At the conference, Argentine civilian political leaders and active-duty and retired military officers reflected on their sometimes conflictive experiences. Their insights were shared and evaluated by experts from Israel, Spain and the United States -- democracies that have successfully managed their civil-military relationships; and others -- such as Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil, which are still struggling with the legacy of their own authoritarian past.

The Montevideo conference built upon previous NDI efforts in the area of civil-military relations, focusing on the Argentine experience. The event had three primary goals: 1) to broaden the understanding between military and political professionals in Argentina; 2) to explore ways to promote interest in and expectations about defense issues among Argentine civilians, and 3) to suggest specific steps that might be taken to promote better civil-military relations. The conference was sub-divided into four general themes: "The Role of the Parliament in Defense and National Security Issues," "Command and Control of the Armed Forces in a Democracy," "The Integration of Civilian and Military Institutions in a Democracy," and "Democracy, Intelligence and Internal Security."

After selected participants presented their ideas at plenary sessions, the conferees dispersed among six mini-groups where a given topic was examined more closely. The mini-groups were charged with elaborating three or four specific ideas for each topic relating to the promotion of healthier civil-military relations.

Although the conference brought together Argentines of many different political ideologies and professions, the Montevideo meeting concluded with a broad consensus on several civil-military issues. Author Jorge Luis Borges' *sad dictum*,

that Argentines were "patriots without compatriots," was challenged at the Uruguay conference. A final document, the "Declaration of Montevideo," prepared by a special drafting committee and based on the recommendations of the mini-groups, was approved unanimously at the end of the conference. It was presented a week later by a member of the NDI staff to Argentine Defense Minister Italo A. Luder.

OVERVIEW

Questions concerning the relationship between a nation's armed forces and civil society have intrigued and bedeviled democratic thinkers since the time of ancient Athens. Clearly an answer to the question, "Who will guard the guardians?" must be resolved before other fundamental political, economic and social issues can be fully addressed. Moreover, in an emerging democracy, the security question can only be addressed if the nation's political actors focus on consensus-building and the construction of durable institutions administered by well-informed civilians.

As former U.S. Vice President Walter Mondale has noted, in any successful democracy the national defense, and issues such as the mission and structure of the armed forces, must derive from a broad social and political consensus. If they do not, armed institutions face the often destabilizing prospect of hard questioning -- from without and from within -- about their own relevance. In times of crisis, a military without broad civilian support risks being seen as an occupying force in its own nation. At the same time, as retired Argentine army officer Nestor Cruces noted at the Montevideo conference, a weak military is not necessarily good for democracy. "The military, even when weakened, will always be strong enough to overthrow a civilian government," Cruces said, "because the latter is unarmed." A better solution, he said, is for civilian authorities to effectively lead the armed forces.

In the newly-emerging democracies of Latin America, relations between civilian leaders and the military have too often been marred by misunderstanding and communication failures, which have resulted in tragedy. Military officers believed that civilian political leaders were incapable of understanding defense and security issues. By training, by patterns of social interaction, and by choice, the military community often considered itself distintos y mejores (different and better) than its civilian counterparts. [Paradoxically today, "military officers doubt that civilians recognize their importance to society," said retired Argentine general Jose Goyret.] At the same time, civilians have often shied away from interaction with the armed forces, out of fear,

disinterest, or a concern about being "contaminated" by such interaction. In many societies, two separate subcultures appear to have emerged.

Today, a consensus is emerging among civilian political leaders and their uniformed counterparts that new forms of interaction must be tried. "Civilians and the military belong to the same society," said Radical party parliamentary deputy Victorio Bisciotti, "even though some on both sides still do not want to admit it." It is understood that the military has a right to expect that its concerns will be treated with respect by expert civilian authorities. However, it is also true that the very nature of authoritarian regimes has conspired against the emergence of a cadre of civilian experts. As former Vice President Mondale has noted, the lack of continuity of political institutions has meant a loss of historical memory, gaps in technical training, and an absence of the personal ties that sustain goodwill in times of crisis.

In the case of Argentina, civil-military relations have languished since early in this century, when the ruling political elite turned its back on its role of overseeing military issues. Since that time, civilian political leaders have paid dearly for such neglect. In the half century prior to Argentina's return to democratic rule in 1983, only two elected governments (one of which came to office through vote fraud) completed their terms -- the rest were cut short by coups. Although invariably led by the military, the responsibility for these interruptions of constitutional rule must also be shared by Argentine civilian elites. As Spanish army Col. Prudencio Garcia observed, in Argentina the problem of military intervention in politics had historically been exacerbated by the political opposition's support of subversive military behavior.

As was pointed out in the Montevideo conference, the military question continues to be a central issue in Argentina's new democratic system. It was noted that within a period of less than 20 months, from Easter Week 1987 to December 1988, military officers rebelled three times against the government of President Raul Alfonsin. The military men had risen in support of fellow officers under prosecution for human rights abuses committed during the so-called "dirty war" against leftist guerrillas and others in the mid-1970s to early 1980s. In a related incident in early 1989, an ultra-leftist group attacked an infantry regiment on the outskirts of Buenos Aires. Unlike reactions in the past, in each of the four attacks, Argentina's political community gave almost unanimous support to the nation's constitutional authorities in quelling the rebellions.

The failure to find the proper means by which to treat military issues in a constitutional setting, however, continues to generate conflicts. "There is a resistance [on the part of the military] to be subordinate when civilians do not know military issues," said Argentine admiral Emilio Nigoul at the conference. "And to express an opinion, even today, which is not in agreement with the government's line -- even on a purely technical question -- can cost an officer his career."

According to one military officer from neighboring Uruguay, members of the armed forces are often distrustful of civilians who seek more knowledge about military affairs. At the same time, he complained about an "almost ancestral" lack of knowledge by civilians about the armed forces, and about the former's unwillingness to accept the military as a social group. "Eighty percent of the unjust image suffered by the armed forces is the fault of the politicians," he said. The political parties, he added, have, as a group, an entree to all sectors of society; therefore they have a responsibility for educating civilians as to the role of the military in a democracy.

The political community has had difficulty in providing positive guidance to military officers eager to reaffirm their role in democratic society. Several participants underscored their belief that while the military was ready to be "reintegrated" into Argentine society as early as 1983, civilian society itself was neither willing nor ready for that to occur. As military sociologist Gustavo Druetta noted, in 1983 the platforms of Argentina's two major parties -- the Peronists and the Radical Civic Union -- focused almost entirely on the "errors" of the previous military regime and how to deal with them. They did not develop a broad concept of defense within which the military could function. The failure to do so was obvious in a comment made by Pablo Melfi, a civilian intelligence specialist in the Alfonsin government: "Before becoming an 'expert' on defense, I want to debate whether or not we want armed forces and, if we do, what kind do we want."

THE ISSUES CONFRONTING ARGENTINE POLICYMAKERS

I. The Role of Parliament

Despite concern over the continuing instability of civil-military relations, Argentine participants in the Montevideo conference were able to point to several important steps recently taken toward developing healthier civil-military relations. The parliamentary debate during the mid-1980s over a newly-approved Defense Law was unique, Radical Party defense advisor Jose Manuel Ugarte said, because it included a sophisticated discussion about what type of defense was needed by Argentina. Members of parliament transcended partisan considerations, and treated the issue with "depth and detail."

The absence of any tradition of congressional involvement in defense policy, several participants agreed, helped account for the fact that only eight initiatives begun by parliament were approved by the respective defense committees during the Alfonsin government. Since 1983, however, the prospect for more informed and aggressive legislative initiatives appears to have improved, as several staff and consultants have been hired by the defense committees. A number of deputies have also arranged to have advisors provided by private research organizations.

Conference participants agreed that the Argentine parliament should play a fundamental role in issues of defense and national security. Several questions concerning the role of the legislature were singled out for examination. For example, what exactly was the role of parliament? What means of communication existed between the parliament and the armed forces, and how could they be improved? And what specific measures might be taken to fortify the parliament's constitutional role in defense and national security?

According to Jose Manuel Ugarte, the role of parliament must be empowered in order to further civilian oversight of the armed forces. To achieve this, the formulation of policy with the Executive Branch, and more exchange of information with the Executive Branch and the military services, are needed. He said that military claims of "secrecy" have limited the parliament's ability to gather information, and reports requested from the armed forces by parliamentary committees are often delayed and incomplete. Ugarte also complained that, while military officers have been assigned by the armed forces to work with parliament, the arrangements "are not, to date, very effective." In general, noted Adm. Nigoul, "there is no coordination with and response from parliament about the professional concerns of the armed forces, even though parliament can, through the Defense Ministry, summon the heads of the services to appear before it as many times as needed." Nigoul said that several times members of the parliamentary defense commissions were invited to attend military functions, "but they didn't even send staff."

Speaking more generally, Julio Busquets, vice chairman of the defense commission of the Spanish Cortes (parliament), said that there "was no single answer" to the question about the proper role of parliament in military oversight. Busquets noted that parliaments normally carry out three functions: budgetary formulation; legislation, and audit or control. In strong democracies, he said, all committees are alike; in a weak one, care must be taken in defining their role to avoid destabilizing the

constitutional regime. During Spain's transition to democracy, Busquets noted, parliament had little to say on defense policy, leaving the major role to the Executive Branch until democracy was consolidated.

Busquets warned about the dangers of mechanically applying a parliamentary model from another country to Argentina, saying it was necessary to create one "appropriate" to local conditions. He said that in most democracies, the role of Congress is limited, given that most legislation is generated by the Executive Branch. In the case of the countries in the Southern Cone of South America, he said that the lack of an important security threat and the region's generally weak economies suggested specific budgetary initiatives. Materiel, rather than personnel, appeared to be a more promising target for budget-cutting, he said. One related question that should be examined, he added, was whether the costs of raising a volunteer army are more than one made up of conscripts. Concerning the audit and control functions carried out by parliaments, Busquets said that congressmen were not always the best candidates for inspecting bases, and that problems frequently arose concerning their conduct on trips.

Several participants spoke about the need for better, more specific parliamentary control over the military. Retired navy Capt. Carlos Raimondi said that Argentina's Defense Law needed more specificity concerning the military's role in internal security. Dante Giadone, president of the Arturo Illia Foundation, noted that there were few former military men serving in parliament, and that retired officers are prohibited by service regulations from discussing politics in public. "Information about parliament's work does not reach society at large," complained Radical Party Deputy Carlos Mosca, "and thus does not reach the armed forces either." What was needed, he said, was a network that provided both information and awareness about each other's work to parliament and the armed forces.

Parliament, said Spanish military sociologist Col. Carlos Gil Muñoz, should not interfere in operational aspects of military policy, but should be involved in broader defense issues. Operational issues are eminently technical and tactical, not strategic, he said. Defense, Gil Muñoz added, is the task of everyone, and the military is starting to understand what its subordination to civilian control means. Quite simply, he said, effective civilian oversight of the nation's armed forces implies "civilianizing" the military, and "militarizing" civilians.

Possible Solutions:

The mini-groups were given the task of recommending a list of concrete proposals for enhancing civilian-military

relations. A synthesis of these ideas were contained in the "Declaration of Montevideo."

Concerning the role of parliament, the following ideas were advanced:

* Parliament should find ways to work with the armed forces in long-range budget planning. It should also take part in the formulation of the budget itself. Because of the size of Argentina's defense bureaucracy and the need to study and supervise it, a congressional capacity akin to the U.S. Congressional Budget Office might be established to assess the Executive Branch's proposals.

* The function of the parliamentary defense commissions should be reexamined to ascertain to what degree they should be involved in determining military and defense policy.

* A high-level Defense Ministry office, composed of ranking military officials and their civilian counterparts, should be established to advise and interact [en función de enlace] with parliament.

* Periodic visits by parliamentarians and their staffs to military bases, and similar visits by military officers to parliament, should be established. Members of defense commissions should initiate greater contact with the armed forces, such as acquainting themselves with officer candidates before they are promoted. Seminars for committee members, to which officers are invited to discuss military issues, should also be established.

* A permanent "technical staff," appointed by committee members, should be created and invested with the resources and manpower to effectively and efficiently advise the parliamentary defense committee. This staff should be allocated its own office space, rather than having to operate out of cramped congressional offices.

* Military and defense information should be computerized, and more should be collected from the appropriate ministries.

* New rules should be enacted so that weekly meetings of defense committee staff on legislative drafts and technical issues are held. Similarly, there should be formal ties and regular meetings with any public or private organization that has a role in designing security policy.

* Members of congress from abroad should be regularly invited to Argentina to consult on questions of military and defense policy.

* Books published by military officers should be

presented in ceremonies in parliament, with parliamentarians offered the opportunity to comment on their contents.

II. Command and Control of the Armed Forces in a Democracy

A general consensus was reached in Montevideo concerning issues of command and control of the armed forces. Several specific questions were addressed: What current mechanisms are used to define the role of the armed forces in Argentina's democratic society? How can they be improved? What is the relationship between the Defense Ministry and the military joint command? How do the branches of the armed forces relate among themselves and to the society at large? What additional steps can be taken to ensure a closer collaboration among the Executive Branch, parliament, and the armed forces on issues of national defense?

Several participants suggested that the role of the Defense Ministry and its relationship with the military's joint command ought to be strengthened. Some participants complained that the relationship between the Defense Ministry and the military high command (Estado Mayor) needed to be better defined. In particular, it was agreed that a precise national strategic directive needed to be issued by civilian authorities, so that the armed forces could use it as a framework for their own planning. It was also suggested that communication among the different services' high commands be encouraged, and that the civilian authorities clearly establish and define the role of each service.

Retired army Col. Néstor Cruces suggested that there should be a division of leadership between the "political" role of the Defense Minister and the "organizational-technical" attributes of the head of the high command. Participants in the Montevideo conference also said that in the promotion of officers, special consideration should be given to those who have served in joint command positions. This would help ensure that such posts are not seen as a dead-end, and thus facilitate greater coordination among the services.

III. The Integration of Civilian and Military Institutions in a Democratic Society

The Montevideo conference also addressed the question: What steps can be taken by government, the political parties, and other institutions, to integrate the armed forces into the social and political life of society? The participants were asked to identify civic education tools

that should be developed in order to reflect a new consensus about the role of the armed forces in a democratic society. In particular, what experiences from other countries might be adapted to fit the Argentine case? What specific steps could be taken -- by government, the political parties, and other institutions -- to enhance civilian understanding of national defense issues?

The armed forces, said Argentine Adm. Emilio Nigoul, should be used to support Argentine foreign policy. "The military should be consulted, not to decide what policy is correct, but rather in a technical way, because a decision in foreign policy affects the armed forces operationally for years." Uruguayan social scientist Juan Rial noted that, unlike the case of Europe, throughout Latin America there was generally little integration between the foreign and defense ministries. An exception, he said, was Brazil, which characteristically issues five-year "plans" for defense based on consultations between civilian and military institutions.

The conference recognized that even in the best cases, the very nature of the two sub-cultures -- one uniformed, one civilian -- makes for occasional misunderstandings and conflicts. There is no law in Argentina that integrates the public into defense, said retired navy Capt. Carlos Raimondi, who admiringly cited Switzerland's example of training civilians in military operations to support the army in times of war.

A marked tendency towards "ghettoization" of civilian and military elites in Argentina has greatly exacerbated those clashes. In joining the debate, Peronist Party defense advisor Hernan Patiño Mayer commented that the educational differences between civilians and the military, on technical issues, for example, must be recognized with an eye towards making them compliment one another.

Uruguayan social scientist Juan Rial noted that relations between political parties and the armed forces in Argentina and Uruguay were different from those in Southern Europe and in neighboring Brazil. In Southern Europe, he said, outside influences such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forced an accommodation between civilian and military elites, while in Brazil the armed forces have traditionally been closer to the political establishment. Such an accommodation has taken more time in Uruguay and Argentina, Rial said, because it has been resisted by both the military and civilian communities.

One of the primary problems in establishing a healthier interplay between civilian and military institutions in Argentina, said Spanish army Col. Prudencio Garcia, was the armed forces' academic teachings that reinforced the role of officers as political actors. Doctrines, he asserted,

that claim the armed forces are responsible for guaranteeing the State's internal survival are, in a democracy, a "mistake." The military's role in society, Garcia said, "is not to judge governmental policy, but to be led by elected authorities."

In Israel, democracy thrives alongside a high degree of military preparedness. As a recent NDI report noted: "One of the most remarkable features of Israeli democracy is the extraordinary degree of civilian control over the military in a nation that is so dependent on its armed forces for day-to-day survival. Israel has turned the need to maintain a large military, which so often proves the undoing of democracy, into one of its greatest democratic bulwarks; at the same time, it has built one of the most effective military forces in the world."

The Israeli armed forces have established an education program that is both "essential and ambitious," said air force Brig. Gen. Nehemia Dagan, a former chief of education for the Israeli Defense Force. Dagan pointed out such training is essential because Israelis enter adult society as members of the military, serving as conscripts between the ages of 18 and 21.

Israeli military recruits receive instruction in democracy and culture, Dagan said, and the idea that the army is an instrument of the political regime is reinforced. All officers are selected -- at age 18 -- from the same corps of draftees, and are sent to study at civilian universities for three years between the ages of 20 and 30. "This allows bright people to attend the university first, then join the military," he said. A special effort is made to bring a soldier's family for visits at the military bases, thus integrating them into the military environment. Israeli soldiers can also retire at 40 and draw maximum benefits, thus enabling them to start second careers at a relatively young age.

Possible Solutions:

Participants in the mini-groups suggested a number of steps that could promote a better integration between military and civilian institutions:

- * More seminars and conferences should be organized by political parties and academic institutions in order to deepen civilian understanding of military issues, and to promote contacts between the armed forces and civil society.

- * Universities should establish, and offer as part of their curriculum, courses on national defense and strategy.

- * Military personnel should be encouraged to advance

their service careers by receiving permission to study one year or more in civilian universities. In this regard, the navy was encouraged to expand its program of offering to its members the possibility of studying at the University of La Plata and other civilian academic institutions.

* The Defense Ministry should offer awards to university students who have excelled in the course of studying defense and military strategy. Similarly, parliament, the Education Ministry or civilian authorities should recognize military students who distinguish themselves in university studies. High school students should be encouraged to learn more about Argentina's armed forces through programmed visits to military installations.

* The armed forces should consider allowing civilians to participate in some of the courses offered to officers by the war colleges.

* Laws and administrative rulings that impede retired military officers from fully exercising their political rights as a citizen should be abolished.

* Military academies should not be the only sources of recruitment for the armed forces.

* The United States Defense Department can assist the integration of civilian and military institutions in Argentina by including representative civilians in training and military assistance programs.

IV. Democracy, Intelligence and Internal Security

The most polemical debate raised at the Montevideo conference concerned the role of the military in internal intelligence and security. There were differing definitions of security, and of the proper relationship between the police and the military. Discussion revolved around the following questions: What should be the role of the security forces in the provision of internal security? How does this differ from their role in providing defense from external threats? What are the advantages and disadvantages of giving the armed forces a role in the interdiction and repression of drug trafficking? How can bilateral, regional and international cooperation be improved in order to enhance political stability?

Finally, conference participants addressed the issue of how to implement adequate coordination between the political community and the security forces when crises related to internal security arise. In particular, they were asked to address what lessons might be learned from recent developments in Argentina, such as the January 1989 attack by political extremists on the army base at La

Tablada, and the May 1989 food riots in several of the country's largest cities.

Several participants suggested that the anti-communist slant in armed forces' doctrine concerning "internal subversion" left them unprepared for dealing with most forms of domestic violence. The key for providing real security, said Peronist parliamentary advisor Luis Tibiletti, is the formation of internal security forces. These, he said, "can use violence, but must be professionals who understand the nature of domestic strife, protest, crime, etc., and how to work within the population." Radical Party intelligence specialist Eduardo Estevez noted that, "the education and the mentality of the military makes it difficult for it to interpret social conditions and their significance." Estevez said that the recent extremist attack on the La Tablada army barracks underscored the need to improve coordination between the provinces and the federal police and gendarmery.

According to Peronist sociologist Jose Miguens, the trend toward democratization in Latin America has made the dichotomy "violence vs. tolerance" -- rather than ideology -- the fundamental litmus test against which security threats must be judged. There are many definitions of "internal security," Miguens noted, but one of the most confusing is the one that characterizes it as "social order." The armed forces are neither trained for assessing ideologies, nor for undertaking police-like intervention into private homes. Unlike the military, the police are required to work with the courts, thus ensuring some oversight of their activities, Miguens added. Peronist Party defense advisor Hernan Patiño Mayer suggested the need for additional clarification of the term "subversion" and what to do about it.

Juan Rial, the Uruguayan social scientist, said that political leaders sometimes mistakenly used the size of an irregular force to determine a threat, and whether the military should intervene. Because exceptions could not be covered in legislation, he said, authorities were allowed little leeway in responding to security threats. Meanwhile, he said, the armed forces' perception of "subversion" is subject to interpretation in the context of rapid political changes throughout the world. First, it is not as easy to determine what constitutes a security "menace," he said. Second, the armed forces are being forced to rethink their identity as a result of changes in the communist world, and in U.S. policy. For example, Rial pointed out, "containment" no longer means the same thing as it did in the depths of the Cold War.

Why, in Uruguay, is internal intelligence left in the hands of the military? Rial asked. The answer, he said, is simple: There are no civilian professionals able to

effectively carry out such functions. The Uruguayan judicial system is slow and unable to supervise swift security operations. And, "let's face it, our police are not very good," he added, citing low pay, poor training and minimal maintenance.

Like most of the other conference participants, Rial also took issue with calls for an enhanced military role in anti-narcotics efforts. He argued that such a role was contrary to the purpose of the armed forces. "An army is meant to kill or be killed, not to look for drug traffickers," he said. "If the armed forces cannot be a police force in the United States, why should that role be assigned to them in Latin America?"

The military's role in internal security is an important issue for the preservation of democracy, said David McGiffert, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs. Contrary to popular belief, in the United States the military does have a role in maintaining internal security, albeit a very limited one. McGiffert explained that historically there has been a marked distrust of a large standing army in peacetime. Only since the end of World War II has that attitude somewhat changed. Local law enforcement, he added, was always the principal security agency, and most crimes were considered local or state offenses. The only two exceptions were cases of insurrection and the enforcement of U.S. federal law.

Only recently, with the growing number of crimes involving financial dealings, narcotics and interstate trade has the federal government assumed a greater role in law enforcement, McGiffert said. To deal with these crimes the Federal Bureau of Investigation was established after World War I, and was staffed with well-paid lawyers. There have been only a handful of events in recent American history that have required the use of the military in providing, or restoring, internal security. During the urban riots of the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson required that, in instances where federal troops were called up, a state's governor had to confirm that the state could not control the situation. Even then, a representative of the Justice Department accompanied the troops, and maintained direct contact with the president.

Retired Adm. Argimiro Fernandez, the former head of Argentine naval intelligence, suggested that a practical approach be used when discussing the future role of the intelligence services. One way to analyze the issue is to break down their specific missions into a discussion of their specific needs. In discussing intelligence issues, he said, one must take care to separate those people who act to gather information from those who execute counter-insurgency. "One must remember that subversion is

not so simply or easily defined by space, size or time," Fernandez said. "It is complex, and therefore requires a similar response."

THE CASE OF URUGUAY

Given the conference venue in Montevideo, and Uruguayan participation, several conferees expressed an interest in comparing and contrasting Uruguay's recent transition to democracy, begun in 1985, with that of Argentina. It was pointed out that just a few months before the NDI conference, Uruguayans had voted overwhelmingly in a referendum to refrain from prosecuting military officers implicated in human rights abuses during the previous military regime. Some experts noted that the security threat from leftist guerrillas in Uruguay was, at one time, significantly greater than that faced in Argentina. Others asserted that, despite its harsh rule, the Uruguayan military regime did not "disappear" a large number of political opponents. Still others pointed out that, before the referendum, not a single military or police officer had been forced to testify before civilian courts.

In part, Uruguay has escaped the traumas surrounding Argentine civil-military relations because a significant part of the political community has refused to take part in an investigation of past events, and the prosecution of those responsible. Unlike the Argentine transition, Uruguay's move to democracy was the result of an explicit "pact" between several major political parties and the military. These negotiations, according to Uruguayan researcher Maria del Huerto Amarillo, left the military issue untouched. Gradually, she said, civil society has "accommodated itself" to the military by relying on negotiations.

Several Argentine participants said the Uruguayans did not have a "military problem" because they refused to admit that one existed. Some Uruguayans responded that their gradual approach was key to reducing tensions and areas of conflict. "It is essential to proceed incrementally, developing acquaintances and trust, and not looking towards where we will be in the distant future," said Luis Hierro Lopez, president of the Uruguayan Chamber of Deputies. "A frank discussion between the military and civilians is now common -- trust exists on both sides."

Despite the establishment of good personal relations, Hierro Lopez admitted, Uruguayan political parties "do not yet have clear ideas about defense and the future role of the military." Uruguay still does not have a military/defense policy, said Blanco Party parliamentary Deputy Luis Ituño, although it needs one. The Uruguayan parliament, he said, has very little involvement in defense policy. "It is treated more as an academic issue than a policy one."

Uruguayans, said Rial, do not discuss these issues in public like the Argentines because they know that they do not have any easy answers. "Why waste time and energy on rhetoric?" asked another conference participant.

CONCLUSION

The conference participants agreed to a series of practical recommendations for improving civil-military relations in emerging democracies. These suggestions were included in the "Declaration of Montevideo" issued at the end of the conference.

The declaration recommended that existing laws, including the constitution, be amended to stipulate the armed forces' subordination to civilian rule. "The formulation of military strategy should reflect the priorities of a country's civilian leadership," the communique said.

The conference participants also called for open channels of communication between the legislature and the military, as well as a greater role for parliamentary defense committees in the development and oversight of military budgets. The declaration recommended that the armed forces refrain from domestic intelligence activities and, in the case of Argentina, that the police -- not the armed forces -- lead the war against drug trafficking.

